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Decentralization Processes in Croatia and Slovenia
Ladislav Cabada
Abstract: The article analyzes the decentralisation processes in two post-Yugo-
slavian countries that underwent a distinctively different development after their 
secesion from Yugoslavia. The analyzes veriﬁ es two basic hypothesis: 1) the the 
process of joining the European Union, especially the demand to accept speciﬁ c 
criteria of home politics, includes the demand for subsidiarity and decentraliza-
tion; 2) that the development of democracy encourages the decentralization process 
more than the development in an authoritative regime, or in a regime with limited, 
e.g. formal democracy.
Key words: European Union, Croatia, Slovenia, democracy, development, 
home politics
Introduction
Decentralization has been one of the principal subjects in political research in 
recent decades. The rise in interest in decentralization processes has been primarily 
related to the emphasis on the application of the principle of subsidiarity in the 
evolving European Union (see e.g. Fiala et al., 2002). However, the debates about 
the possibilities of decentralization also implicitly involve historical issues (see e.g. 
Tägil 1999, various Czech publications dealing with Central Europe, but also e.g. 
Moravia). Naturally, “regionalism“ and “decentralization“ are not synonyms, but the 
relatively high level of correlation between the question of regional identities and 
the principle of decentralization, as well as of subsidiarity, is more than obvious.    
Even today, there are black and white views still to be found in (not only) Czech 
politics and political science discourses. These simplistic views reﬂ ect, on the one 
hand postwar development in the western part of Europe as “natural”, including 
the question of “democratic decentralization and the application of the subsidi-
arity” principle, and the development in the countries of the socialist community as 
completely centralizing and prohibiting any natural activity on local and regional 
levels, on the other  hand. It is beyond any doubt that the Soviet-controlled countries 
of real socialism – Stalinist Albania and Tito’s Yugoslavia – were to a great extent 
modelled on the idea of democratic centralism; however, here too, we could observe 
indications of relatively independent local political and social formations (based 
especially on historical regional ties), though shaping under continuous – often not 
very severe – supervision of the central authorities. On the contrary, we can regard 
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various post-1945 signs of regionalism  in Western Europe as “artiﬁ cial”; the best 
example are some of the cross-border regions (Greber, 1999: 180-181), the forma-
tion of which continues in the new EU Member States.
We have a tendency to forget the fact that after the Second World War – but also 
in previous periods – the countries of Western Europe did indeed pass through a 
process of strict centralization, which manifested itself at both cultural-political 
(liberal nationalist trends towards the uniﬁ cation of citizens) and economic levels 
(creation of state monopolies and nationalization in certain business sectors). It was 
only at the end of the ﬁ rst phase of postwar stabilization that the Western European 
countries approached – with differences in willingness, speed, and intensity – po-
litical decentralization. 
Similar processes can be observed in the Central European area, which passed 
through democratic transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and is now passing 
through a process of reconﬁ guration of territorial-political relations. Let us remind 
the reader that in 1991-92 a more or less violent break-up of three post-communist 
states, which had declared their federative character already in previous periods – 
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia – took place. The moment that 
political ties in these multinational formations loosened, individual nations and 
ethnic groups, or their political representations, tended to the idea of national self-
determination, independence and state sovereignty.   
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, 
the maps of Europe, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia saw the emergence of 20 
new state formations with different qualities of statehood. On one hand, we have 
historical formations which to some extent succeeded in preserving their identity 
of “succession states” – Russia, the Czech Republic, and Serbia. On the other hand, 
some states  emerged as if “by mistake”, and their current position roughly corre-
sponds to that of forgotten or even failed states (Moldova). Croatia and Slovenia, the 
countries examined in this study, lie somewhere between these two extremes. These 
two countries do not want to be associated with Milošević’s Yugoslavia (they do not 
seek the position of “succession state”), but at the same time see their development 
in Royal and Tito’s Yugoslavia as an important part of their national evolution. The 
development is also identiﬁ ed with the idea of federation and with the countries’ 
relatively autonomous existence within Yugoslavia. 
In 1991 Slovenia and Croatia decided to leave Yugoslavia and become independent 
states. While Slovenia went through the process of secession relatively peacefully, 
the attempt at Croatian secession led to the Croatian-Serbian conﬂ ict, which later 
exhibited the characteristics of civil war, and resulted in the subsequent separation of 
the Serb-populated regions from Croatia. Hence, it was the very nature of secession 
that determined some of the differences in the political development of both post-
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Yugoslav countries, including the development of decentralization tendencies in both 
societies (although there is also some correspondence to be found – see below). 
This study does not aim at analysing the development and the nature of decen-
tralization processes in Croatia and Slovenia in an exhaustive manner. Such a goal 
would require much more time and space. Our goal is to present and analyse basic 
(de)centralization trends in both examined countries and thus provide an introduc-
tory contribution for subsequent comparative studies that would set Croatia’s and 
Slovenia’s decentralization processes into a broader context of Central-East Euro-
pean countries, or the European Union.
The possibilities for decentralization in Tito’s Yugoslavia, and the  Second World 
War and its outcomes represented a radical turning point for the idea of regional 
development and decentralization in Tito’s Yugoslavia. The turning point is reduced 
by the vast majority of literature to the arrival of the Communist Party and the 
application of a highly centralized model, with the deciding voice of the Com-
munist nomenclature or the representatives of repressive forces (secret police and 
the Yugoslav People’s Army). It is apparent that – regardless of the democratization 
efforts from the 1950s to the 1980s, which resulted in a far more tolerable and hos-
pitable régime than in the countries where real socialism applied – Yugoslavia, too, 
preferred a centralist state model. These trends were no doubt further fuelled by the 
fact that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had been completely paralysed by nationalist 
tensions and that one of the fundamental promises made by the AVNOJ (Tito´s) 
Yugoslavia was to reconcile individual nations.      
The Second World War and the arrival of Tito’s régime thus also resulted in a 
territorial-administrative model which considerably differed from interwar Yugo-
slavia. The régime recognized the autonomous existence of ﬁ ve “state-forming” 
nations (Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians, Slovenians and Serbs; in the second 
half of the 1960s, Slavic Muslims – Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims – were rec-
ognized as a nation also) living in the six Socialist Republics of the federation 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia and Serbia), 
and speaking four languages (Croatian, Macedonian, Slovenian and Serbian; after 
the 1950s language union, Croatian and Serbian were considered one language – 
Serbo-Croatian – with two different alphabets).
It is evident that the arrangement was well received, especially by the Slovenian 
public6, despite the fact that as early as in 1946 Tito, or the Yugoslav Communists, 
decided to transform Yugoslavia into an exemplary follower of the Soviet Union 
and of the model of democratic centralism. As Janko Prunk argues (2002: 155), the 
6 It is obvious that the new arrangement of national relations satisﬁ ed mainly Macedonians and 
Montenegrins.
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second Yugoslavia was in many aspects more centralized than the pre-war king-
dom, but Slovenia lived its autonomous cultural and educational life. It had its 
own ﬂ ag, constitution, legislation, parliament, Government and other institutions 
typical of nation-state (see Cabada, 2005). Postwar Yugoslavia regained the region 
of what is today the Slovenian Littoral (annexed to Slovenia with the exception of 
Trieste and its territory) and Istria (the largest part annexed to Croatia; the other, 
much smaller, part to Slovenia) which were ceded by Italy. The union of the Slov-
enian historical regions (in the cases of Carinthia and Styria only the southern parts 
of them) into a single administrative-political unit no doubt represented a good 
move for Slovenian society.     
As for Croatian society, such a positive attitude cannot be talked about, especially 
regarding the fact that Croats found themselves in an (seemingly) independent state 
(the Independent State of Croatia) established during the Second World War. While 
characterized by genocide against Serbian, Jewish and Roma minorities, the Fascist 
puppet state was perceived by many Croats as the embodiment of their desire for an 
independent state, which was declared both within the Kingdom of Hungary (mainly 
in the middle of the 19th century), and in the later Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The inte-
gration of Croatia into Yugoslavia thus represented a regressive step for many Croats. 
After the Tito-Stalin split, Yugoslavia set out on the path of “constitutional 
adventurism”, which also affected the system of local administration. The 1952 
General Act on People’s Committees introduced communes (opstina, opština, 
opčina), districts and cities as units of local and national state administration. 
Communes were designated as a means of decentralization to reduce the role of 
the state, combining the functions of both local and public administration (Cabada, 
2000b: 121). Gradually, they became the key mediator between collective elements 
(subunits, e.g. parents or tenants associations) of society and economic-political 
institutions. In the second half of the 1960s, however, the activities of communes 
were supplanted by self-autonomizing reformists in the lead of the Leagues of 
Communists of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. The loosening of relations between 
the central government headed by Tito and the governments of the Republics cul-
minated in 1968, but after the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, Tito decided 
to re-centralize the system. 
In an attempt to subdue criticism of intervention against the liberal leaderships 
in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, Tito decided to reform the Constitution. The re-
sult was the Constitution of 1974, which gave the Republics the right to decide 
independently on their status (it was later used in the debate over the legality of 
independence), and created among others a new deﬁ nition of the system of local 
and national state administration. The powers of communes were further extended 
to include the right to levy taxes on the inhabitants of communes; this measure is 
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clearly at variance with the view of Yugoslavia as a highly centralized state. How-
ever, the communal independence was limited by a number of obligations ﬂ owing 
from the Constitution (e.g. civil defence, income security for veterans etc.). “Com-
munes were established by law and could merge. Each commune approved its own 
status, deﬁ ned by the Constitution as a social contract of the communal members” 
(Cabada, 2000b: 127).      
In many respects, communes only masked the unlimited rule of local leaders 
allied with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. However, on the other hand, 
we must mention the fact that especially in the 1980s, communes in Slovenia, and 
partly also those in Croatia, were “inﬁ ltrated” by the emerging civil society, and 
were seen by many inhabitants as a positive manifestation of decentralization, or as 
an attempt to bring politics closer to the people. Notwithstanding these facts, the 
independence processes and following months and years in both Croatia and Slov-
enia were marked by a relatively strong prioritization of centralizing tendencies, 
or rather the suppression of true decentralization political processes. The causes 
are to be found not only in the “immanent” tendency of the former secessionist 
movements to centralize new states, but also in the belief (which was partly well-
founded) that the political representatives of local units would have a hampering or 
restricting inﬂ uence on the processes of democratization, uniﬁ cation and homog-
enization of society, or over the processes regarding the integration into Western 
structures, especially the EU.   
Differences in (De)Centralization processes in Croatia and Slovenia in 
the 1990s
As mentioned above, immediately after declaring independence, Croatia became 
embroiled in a conﬂ ict with the “residual” Serbo-Montenegrin Yugoslavia, which 
also determined, to a certain extent, the separatist tendencies of Croatian Serbs. In 
this situation, the attitude of the Zagreb political representatives, led by President 
Tudjman, towards the idea of a stronger decentralization was logically rather re-
served. In the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s there was a continuous increase in authoritarian 
tendencies in the régime; President Tudjman established himself as an “absolute” 
ruler in the quasi-presidential system, but became more and more dependent on 
quasi-legal groups engaged in the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Cabada, 2000; 
Zakošek, 2002).
On a formal level, after 1991, Croatia decided on a stronger decentralization than 
in the period of Socialist Yugoslavia. In addition to municipalities, which were pre-
served, cities emerged as another form of the lowest level of local administration. 
The 1990 Croatian Constitution ensured the right of municipalities and cities to 
adopt their own statute. These are headed by the elected mayor (opčinski načelnik, 
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gradonačelnik) (Cabada 2000a: 175). At the turn of the millennium, Croatia was 
divided into 547 municipalities and 123 cities (Mimica 2003: 2), with a city consti-
tuting a population of more than 10,000 inhabitants. 
In 1993 the ﬁ rst Chamber of Counties (Županijski dom) election was held; the 
Chamber represented 20 Croatian counties (županije) and the capital of Croatia, 
Zagreb (Hloušek, 2004a: 139). Counties7 represented the level of local administra-
tion standing between the smallest units of local administration – municipalities 
and cities – and the municipality in Zagreb. However, in practice, counties were 
signiﬁ cantly limited in their self-governing politics, both by the (in)appropriate set-
ting of ﬁ nancial standards and the signiﬁ cant interference in their affairs by central 
authorities headed by President Tudjman.  
As for the ﬁ nancial conditions of local governments, it is possible to illustrate 
the progressive centralization by the fact that while in 1990 round total of all local 
budgets amounted to 120 per cent of the state budget of the Socialist Republic 
of Croatia, in 2001 Croatia’s state budget exceeded the total of local budgets ﬁ ve 
times (Lašić 2001: 2)! As regards the restrictions placed on the functioning of 
Croatian local authorities, the best example seems to be the right of the President 
not to appoint an elected county president. Tudjman took the option several times, 
provoking among other things, relatively violent protests in Zagreb, which led to 
the separation of certain groups from the then ruling Croatian Democratic Union 
(HZD) (Zakošek, 2002: 647). The President’s veto was abolished only by the 2001 
amendment to the Law on Local Self-government.  
Under the Constitution counties were represented by the Upper House in Par-
liament – Chamber of Counties), the majority of which involved representatives 
elected in counties. The Constitution ensured each county the same right to elect 
three representatives, and the ﬁ rst elections took place in 1993 (Hloušek, 2004a: 
139). The other ﬁ ve members were appointed by the President; therefore the cham-
ber was not exclusively represented by counties. The Upper Chamber held a veto 
over legislation, which could be outvoted by the lower chamber – the Chamber of 
Deputies (Zastupnički Dom) – only by a two-thirds majority (Cabada, 2000a: 172). 
However, there were no fundamental disputes before 2000, since both chambers 
were dominated by Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Union (HZD). The Chamber 
of Counties was abolished under wider Croatian public administration reforms in 
March 2001 (Zakošek, 2002: 651).
7 Croatia is divided into 20 counties and the capital. These are listed in Croatian: Zagrebačka; 
Krapinsko-zagorska; Sisačko-moslavačka; Karlovačka; Varaždinska; Koprivničko-križevačka; 
Bjelovarsko-bilogorska; Primorsko-goranska; Ličko-senjska; Virovitičko-podravska; Poreško-
slavonska; Brodsko-posavska; Zadarska; Osiječko-baranjska; Šibensko-kninska; Vukovarsko-sri-
jemska; Splitsko-dalmatinska; Istarska; Dubrovačko-neretvanska; Medjimurska. Dragan Antulov 
(2000) presumes that many counties were deﬁ ned on the principle of gerrymandering.
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The aversion to a stronger decentralization of Croatian politics throughout the 
1990s was caused by a combination of various factors. We have to mention the 
impact of the war in the 1990s and secessionist tendencies in regions inhabited 
by the Serb minority in the ﬁ rst half of the decade, which was manifested in the 
authoritarization of the régime, including the tendency towards strengthening cen-
tral institutions, especially the Presidency. This centralization was accompanied by 
an intensiﬁ ed need to control ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows, caused by the efforts to efﬁ ciently 
gather resources for militarization and warfare, but also for keeping needed (or 
chosen) groups of population. Tudjman’s régime did not proceed with any radical 
reform or transformation of economy in the 1990s; the (post) socialist economy 
was controlled from the centre, which could be considered as not really democratic, 
on the other hand, we must note that, in this respect, decentralization without the 
preceding transformation would only worsen the situation. 
Ironically, in the ﬁ rst years of democratic and independent existence, Slovenia 
decided on an even more centralized model of politics and public administration 
than Croatia. Slovenia has different geographic conditions than Croatia – while 
Croatia is geographically extremely heterogeneous (in the northwest lies the Is-
trian Peninsula, jutting towards the west from central Croatia; to the southeast runs 
a narrow and long coastline of the Dalmatian coast separated from the mainland 
by Bosnia and Herzegovina) – Slovenia’s territory is more homogeneous, with the 
capital (Ljubljana) and its agglomeration as the geographically natural centre of the 
country. Its population – which is more than twice as small as Croatia – is ethnically 
much more homogeneous as well.    
We cannot say that Slovenia lacks any regional diversity that could constitute 
the basis for a decentralized model of public administration. From the very be-
ginning of independence, all the larger political parties spoke about the need for 
decentralization; however, on the other hand, they linked the need with the lowest 
units of local self-government – municipalities. Ironically, the process of founding 
municipalities began with their relatively hasty abolishment in 1991. “The debates 
on future functioning of public administration involved various suggestions with 
the common denominator of doubts about the ability of certain villages and cities to 
self-govern ... This scepticism resulted in the return to the municipal model, which 
was passed in 1993 as The Act on Local Self-Government” (Cabada, 2005: 217).
The law deﬁ ned two types of municipalities – “basic” and urban. After the de-
bates provoked by the lack of interest of certain municipalities envisaged in the 
law to self-establish, in 1994 the Parliament decided to establish 147 municipali-
ties, which could afterwards be divided or merged if so decided in a local refer-
endum. Slovenia is now divided into 193 municipalities varying in terms of size 
and ﬁ nancial security. Although the law envisages municipalities  ﬁ nancing their 
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operations from their own sources, the majority of them are currently co-ﬁ nanced 
by the state.8
An important factor characteristic of the functioning of municipalities in Slov-
enia, is the fact that the mayors are eligible to stand for election as Members of 
Parliament. Many mayors (around one third of 90 MPs) sit on a regular basis in 
the lower house of the Slovenian Parliament – the National Assembly (Državni 
zbor). These mayors bring local and regional issues, mainly preparation of  the state 
budget law, into parliamentary discourse. 
In contrast with Croatia, Slovenia did not establish an intermediate level of public 
administration between municipalities and central authorities throughout the 1990s 
– and has not done so, in reality, until now. The discussion over the establishment of 
self-governing regions was launched in the same period as the debates on the deﬁ ni-
tion of municipalities. In addition, the Constitution adopted in 1991 envisages the 
creation of “wider self-governing units”. In this respect, Article 143 says: “Munici-
palities may independently decide to join wider self-governing local communities, 
as well as regions, in order to regulate and manage local affairs of wider importance. 
In agreement with such communities, the state may transfer speciﬁ c matters within 
the state competence into their original competence and determine the participation 
of such communities in proposing and performing particular matters within the 
state competence”. In this respect, we have to consider the fact that municipalities 
have 22 representatives in the Upper House of the Slovenian Parliament – National 
Council (Državni svet). Since there are more than 22 municipalities, they have to 
agree on joint candidacies (Cabada, 2005: 223). 
The Slovenian political parties settled on the years 1994-98 as the period dedicated 
to the stabilization of municipalities, followed by the establishment of regions. As 
early as 1997, however, the Slovenian political scientist Marjan Brezovšek stated that: 
“regions may exist in Slovenia, but the constitutional system and political relations 
inhibit them from establishing themselves as a useful and necessary part of the politi-
cal system” (Brezovšek 1997: 181). The situation remained almost unchanged even 
after 1998, when the regionalization of Slovenia was either completely refused by the 
political parties, or presented as forced upon it by the European Union and in principle 
unnecessary. Moreover, the main political parties – the ruling Liberal Democracy of 
Slovenia (LDS) and the opposition Social Democratic Party of Slovenia (SDS; today 
the Slovenian Democratic Party) – proposed projects involving different numbers and 
deﬁ nitions of regions; which prevented any consensus on this question.9
8 For a detailed analysis of the creation and functioning of Slovenian municipalities, see (Cabada, 
2003) and (Cabada, 2005).
9 For more information on the discussion on the potential establishment of regions in Slovenia, see 
(Cabada, 2003) and (Cabada, 2005).
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We can conclude that in the 1990s Slovenia was a more democratic system than 
Croatia; however, as regards decentralization, Slovenian governments behaved in a 
similar centralizing way as the HZD governments in Croatia.  
In contrast with Croatia, in 1996 Slovenia signed the Association Agreement with 
the EU. The Slovenian border regions were thus able to receive ﬁ nancial support 
from the EU – INTERREG II Programmes: the total investments in Carinthia and 
Styria in 1995-99 totalled 282 million Austrian schillings (Roblek, 2000: 107). Af-
ter 2000, Slovenia received support from INTERREG III Programmes as well. 
Developments after 2000
Tudjman’s death in 1999, followed by the defeat of the HZD in the 2000 parlia-
mentary elections, represented an important turning point in the development of 
Croatian political system. As early as the end of January 2000, the new coalition 
government, headed by Ivica Račan was formed, composed of Social Democrats, 
Social Liberals, but also the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS). The most success-
ful regional political party in Croatia thus joined the government – the IDS won 
every election for the Istria County Regional Parliament. The party programme , 
which operates under Croatian, Italian and Slovenian names (Istarski demokratski 
sabor – Dieta democratice istriana – Istrski demokratski zbor, IDS-DDI-IDZ), in-
cludes creation of a multicultural Istria, development of regional cooperation, and 
primarily long-term decentralization (Hloušek, 2004b: 237; Zakošek, 2002: 657). 
One of the priorities deﬁ ned by Račan’s government was therefore the increased 
decentralization of the state (Hloušek, 2004a: 147).
At ﬁ rst, the achievement of this goal, which used to be identiﬁ ed with “the high-
est” objective – the accelerated accession to the European Union – appeared to be 
the true priority of the Government. In November 2000 the Croatian Government 
even signed a cooperation agreement with the Open Society Institute foundation. 
Under the agreement, the foundation was authorized to prepare the three-year De-
centralization of Public Administration project; the coordination of this project was 
entrusted to the Croatian Law Centre. “The project covered several speciﬁ c areas: 
the electoral system of local elections, the territorial organization of local and re-
gional self-government, the legal status and competences of local self-government, 
the status of local ofﬁ cials, decentralization in the ﬁ elds of primary and secondary 
education, health care, social services and culture, and the ﬁ nancing of local and 
regional self-government” (Vidačak, undated: 82). Nevertheless, the Government 
decided not to implement the project. 
One of the factors limiting the Government’s wish for real decentralization was
the effort to meet the EU accession criteria as soon as possible. The Government
assumed that it should centralize its activities to meet the Copenhagen criteria and 
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feared that the transfer of competences to regions or municipalities would slow the 
process. But what was also important was the fact that in 2000-01, the representa-
tives of the oppositional HZD dominated most of the regions. Igor Vidačak cites 
other reasons (undated: 85) for the present inability of the regions to play a more 
important role in Croatian politics – underfunding, reluctance of local political
élites and ofﬁ cials to adapt to the new circumstances, ignorance of foreign languages 
etc. Considering these facts the Government decided to prefer the status quo (stabil-
ity) over reform, the result of which is very much in doubt (Antulov, 2000: 6), and 
that despite occasional declarations to the contrary. For example, in October 2002 
a big conference was convened in Zagreb, at which several models of reformed 
public administration were presented to the Croatian public. The conference was 
not, however, followed up with any signiﬁ cant applications (Report on Progress in 
the Implementation ...). In May 2001, in response to the Government’s reluctance 
to decentralize politics, the IDS minister left Račan’s government. Neither it nor 
the subsequent government led by Ivo Sanader (HZD), which came to power after 
the autumn 2003 election, still did not and has not found the proper formula for 
real decentralization. Nevertheless, at the European level, Croatian politicians con-
tinue declaring their efforts to decentralize: see for instance the speech given by the
Minister of European Integration in May 2003 (Mimica, 2003), in which he envis-
aged a foundation of the National Agency for Regional Development in 2005 (I have 
not found any reference to its actual foundation so far). Regardless of the rather 
declaratory statements by Croatian politicians, the country came to participate in 
EU INTERREG III B (transnational cooperation) and INTERREG C (interregional 
cooperation) programmes. 
Hence, we could suppose that the Europeanization of Croatian politics regar-
ding the EU accession efforts could also mean decentralization and application 
of the principles of subsidiarity in Croatian politics. It is, however, the case of 
Slovenia, becoming a full EU member on 1 May 2004, which shows that this 
correlation is not evident, and that tendencies for purely limited decentralization 
could possibly occur in the politics of Croatia and other Southeastern  European 
countries seeking to join the EU.     
It was the Slovenian Government or more precisely some of its ministries 
(mainly the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of the Interior) that became key 
actors of the decentralization process after 1999. The principal reason for this 
was the EU’s criticism of Slovenia’s inability or reluctance to establish regional 
self-governing structures. The creation of regions from above, however, was in-
hibited by the dispute between individual political parties with different views 
on the size or number of regions and, naturally, potential regional competences 
(Cabada, 2005: 225).   
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The main political parties agreed on the idea that regions, or provinces (pokra-
jine), should be created as self-governing units with competences transferred 
from the state or municipal level. The major difference lies in different views on 
the number of regions – while the rightist parties (Slovenian Democratic Party, 
Slovenian People's Party, New Slovenia) promoted a greater number of regions 
(23-25); the left-wing and centrist parties (Liberal Democracy of Slovenia, So-
cial Democrats) prefer 8-12 regions. However, these positions are not strictly 
deﬁ ned – for example, the Vice-president of the ruling SDS and current Minister 
of Education Milan Zver came up with the idea of mere three regions: “the rich 
Western Slovenia, Ljubljana and the poor (that is receiving structural funds sup-
port) Eastern Slovenia” (Cabada, 2005: 226).10 These regions vary greatly in eco-
nomic performance and stability – while the GDP of central Slovenia (Ljubljana 
and surroundings) reaches almost 90 per cent of the EU average, it is 80 per 
cent in the case of western Slovenia and only 50 per cent in the case of eastern 
Slovenia. This has resulted signiﬁ cant migration from the east to the centre and 
west (Gosar, 2000: 87). Many political scientists – including the author – thought 
that Slovenia’s accession to the EU would conclude the debate on the deﬁ nition 
of regions. But at the end of 2007, three and a half years after the accession 
to the EU, Slovenia was still waiting for the establishment of regions. Slovenia 
remains divided into 12 statistical units at the NUTS 3 level 3, while the levels 
0 and 1 represent the whole country and the level 2 two units  “Ljubljana and 
surroundings” or “the rest of Slovenia” (Roblek, 2000: 105). As the Slovenian 
political geographer Anton Gosar puts it (2000: 105), the notion of a Europe of 
the Regions is, in the case of Slovenia, transferred to the state level. In addi-
tion, Slovenia refuses to be associated with the Mediterranean and especially the 
“Balkan” dimension of its existence and declares itself to be a “purely” Central 
European state.11   
Conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction, this study does not aim at analysing the de-
velopment and the nature of decentralization processes in Croatia and Slovenia 
in an exhaustive manner. Rather, it is a summary of the basic phases and trends 
10 For more information on the discussion on the potential creation of regions in Slovenia and the 
analysis of the attempts to establish regions from below – under Article 143 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Slovenia – see Cabada, 2005.
11  As Gosar (2000: 73) argues, the Slovenian governments, too, refuse other than Central European 
“state ideology“, which provokes certain tensions in relation to the east and southeast of the coun-
try (regions  bordering with Croatia), but also to the Slovenian Littoral including the Slovenian 
part of Istria (compare the activities of the Istrian Democratic Assembly in Croatia – see above). 
The Central European focus is reﬂ ected in e.g. the content of schoolbooks, in which the Mediter-
ranean and Balkan inﬂ uence on Slovenian society and history are ignored. 
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of the (de)centralizing processes that took place in both countries from 1990 to 
2005. As we showed, regardless of the differences in the developments after gaining 
independence, both countries had signiﬁ cant difﬁ culties in applying the principle 
of subsidiarity in the form of decentralization of politics and public administra-
tion. On the other hand, we also described the variance caused by different political 
developments including the different approach to and the timing of the accession to 
the European Union. 
We can say that Vjeran Katunarić’s ﬁ nding, which he presented in 2003 on the 
basis of the analysis of decentralization processes, is still valid. According to him, 
Croatia and Slovenia dispose of centralized structure, in which municipalities play 
an important role. Other southeastern European countries, the then most promis-
ing EU candidates – Romania and Bulgaria – were directly denoted as centralized 
(Katunarić, 2003: 6-8).     
We may conclude that Croatia and Slovenia are far from fulﬁ lling the principle of 
subsidiarity and even more the less poetic principle of decentralization and region-
alization of politics and public administration. On the other hand, in comparison to 
other post-Yugoslav and post-Soviet countries in the region, both countries made 
the greatest progress towards a properly functioning decentralized model. In both 
countries, the decentralized model is functional primarily at the level of basic ad-
ministrative units (municipalities), while the creation of regions (Slovenia) or their 
functionality (Croatia) is still somewhat retarded.  
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Abstract: The study describes Austria‘s relationship to the EU and the processes 
the country underwent in the past thirteen years as an EU member state. Due to 
its EU accession Austria went through a process of Europeanization. This paper 
analyses the top-down and bottom-up effects of this process. The author begins by 
asking to what extent Europeanization had an impact on the coordination mecha-
nisms of Austrian politics, in particular, the executive and the legislative, and the 
speciﬁ c features of the Austrian political system: federalism and corporatism. The 
analysis shows that the adaptation of institutions to EU model signiﬁ cantly affected 
Austrian politics. The second part of the paper analyses the bottom-up effects, how 
domestic political processes inﬂ uenced the Austrian European policy. Despite the 
strong Europeanization of Austria‘s domestic institutions the research found some 
problem junctures in the relationship between Austria and the EU. This included the 
issue of the coalition government that was formed with the participation of the FPÖ 
in 2000 and the sanctions other EU member states placed on Austria as a response. 
Another case occurred when Austria threatened to veto EU eastern expansion in 
2001. On the basis of these two cases it was found that despite the adaptation of 
domestic institutions, domestic politics can still have a strong effect on European 
relations. However, the long-term trend in Austrian European policy indicates that 
the relationship between strong institutional adaptation and the country‘s positive 
pro-European policy is primarily harmonious.
Keywords: Austria, political system, European policy, coordination system, 
European Union, federalism and the EU, corporatism 
Introduction
Austria has been a member of the European Union for over a decade now. Aus-
tria’s ofﬁ cial request for full membership in the EC13 did not come until 17 July 
1989. It was preceded by a domestic political debate over the advantages and dis-
advantages of membership in the EC, against the background of the changes that 
were occurring in the East-West relationship and intensifying European integration. 
12 This article was not proof-readed by the Politics in Central Europe. The autor holds the full re-
sponsibility for the language quality of the article.
13 ECSC, EEC and EUROATOM.
